工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

联合订货区间值EOQ模型及变权Shapley值成本分摊方法

研究多个销售商企业组成联盟向一个供应商订购同种商品的联合订货问题。考虑到实际问题中很难预测到精确的需求，本文用区间表示单位时间需求量，研究允许缺货的销售商企业联合订货区间值EOQ模型，其中缺货完全回补。以联合订货平均成本最小为目标，结合连续有序加权集结算子求解出联合订货的周期、区间值订货量和区间值平均成本。定义变权Shapley值，给出区间值合作博弈的区间值变权Shapley值的求解方法，得出区间值变权Shapley值的表达式可直接利用相关联盟值的左、右端点计算得到。考虑联盟和局中人的相对重要性，结合需求率确定合成权重，提出基于区间值变权Shapley值的联合订货成本分摊方法。利用数值算例验证模型和方法的有效性。本文可为解决联合订货成本分摊问题提供决策参考。     

基于数量柔性契约的双源应急物资采购定价模型

针对灾害事件发生的不确定性以及灾害发生后应急物资需求量的爆发式增长，本文设计了一个政府主导的基于数量柔性契约的双源应急物资采购模型。在存在一个现货市场的情况下，政府除了常规采购外，还会与供应方签订一份数量柔性契约，用以建立政企联合储备应急物资的合作关系。通过数理推导，本文发现灾害事件发生概率，政府自身储备量，现货市场采购价格会对双方决策产生重要影响，并给出三个影响因素在满足不同条件时政企双方的最优决策，同时进一步分析了这三个因素对政府采购成本与供应方利润的影响。最后，通过数值模拟的方式对所得结论进行了验证。本文的研究为政府与企业构建联合储备应急物资的合作关系提供了指导与依据。     

Social cognition,social neuroscience,and evolutionary social psychology: What's missing?

In this paper I argue that something important, and something social, is missing from contemporary accounts of social cognition, social neuroscience and evolutionary social psychology. Contemporary accounts of social cognition focus on cognition directed towards social objects, that is, towards persons and social groups. In contrast, early twentieth century accounts of socially engaged cognition focused upon beliefs and attitudes oriented to the represented beliefs and attitudes of members of social ‘reference groups’ and directed towards both social and non‐social objects. I argue that this earlier conception of socially engaged cognition should be integrated with contemporary research on social cognition, social neuroscience and evolutionary social psychology, since it poses a challenge but also an opportunity for these disciplines.     

Cross‐Milieu Terrorist Collaboration: Using Game Theory to Assess the Risk of a Novel Threat

This article uses a game‐theoretic approach to analyze the risk of cross‐milieu terrorist collaboration—the possibility that, despite marked ideological differences, extremist groups from very different milieus might align to a degree where operational collaboration against Western societies becomes possible. Based upon theoretical insights drawn from a variety of literatures, a bargaining model is constructed that reflects the various benefits and costs for terrorists’ collaboration across ideological milieus. Analyzed in both sequential and simultaneous decision‐making contexts and through numerical simulations, the model confirms several theoretical arguments. The most important of these is that although likely to be quite rare, successful collaboration across terrorist milieus is indeed feasible in certain circumstances. The model also highlights several structural elements that might play a larger role than previously recognized in the collaboration decision, including that the prospect of nonmaterial gains (amplification of terror and reputational boost) plays at least as important a role in the decision to collaborate as potential increased capabilities does. Numerical simulation further suggests that prospects for successful collaboration over most scenarios (including operational) increase when a large, effective Islamist terrorist organization initiates collaboration with a smaller right‐wing group, as compared with the other scenarios considered. Although the small number of historical cases precludes robust statistical validation, the simulation results are supported by existing empirical evidence of collaboration between Islamists and right‐ or left‐wing extremists. The game‐theoretic approach, therefore, provides guidance regarding the circumstances under which such an unholy alliance of violent actors is likely to succeed.     

Evaluation of multi-objective optimization approaches for solving green supply chain design problems

This paper evaluates the applicability of different multi-objective optimization methods for environmentally conscious supply chain design. We analyze a case study with three objectives: costs, CO₂ and fine dust (also known as PM – Particulate Matters) emissions. We approximate the Pareto front using the weighted sum and epsilon constraint scalarization methods with pre-defined or adaptively selected parameters, two popular evolutionary algorithms, SPEA2 and NSGA-II, with different selection strategies, and their interactive counterparts that incorporate Decision Maker׳s (DM׳s) indirect preferences into the search process. Within this case study, the CO₂ emissions could be lowered significantly by accepting a marginal increase of costs over their global minimum. NSGA-II and SPEA2 enabled faster estimation of the Pareto front, but produced significantly worse solutions than the exact optimization methods. The interactive methods outperformed their a posteriori counterparts, and could discover solutions corresponding better to the DM preferences. In addition, by adjusting appropriately the elicitation interval and starting generation of the elicitation, the number of pairwise comparisons needed by the interactive evolutionary methods to construct a satisfactory solution could be decreased.     

考虑合作程度的电信数据业务合作创新模型研究

基于模型试验，对堆载诱发型边坡滑坡的变形机理及演化过程进行研究。研究结果表明: （1）堆载诱发型滑坡的变形演化规律可归纳为：后缘压缩阶段→蠕动变形阶段→加速滑动阶段→剧滑阶段，且剧滑启动之前的加速变形过渡时间极短；（2）利用FLAC3D软件进行堆载滑坡演化过程的动态数值分析，模拟过程中坡体应力场和位移场的演化特征表现为从上向下逐步贯通，与模型边坡破坏过程相符；（3）堆载诱发型滑坡破坏过程历时短、突发性强，在坡脚产生持续位移时即应做出滑坡预警。     

项目制下各利益主体博弈及其解释———以水库移民后期扶持项目为分析对象

从制度设计来说，水库移民后期扶持项目有着紧密的组织体制与管理体制，但水库移民后期扶持项目制在实际操作过程中偏离了政策目标，导致移民后期扶持项目资金使用绩效低，甚至出现“跑渗漏”的情况。从委托方—承包方—代理方互动的博弈过程分析水库移民后期扶持项目制，研究发现：委托方（中央政府及省级政府）与承包方（地市级政府及县级政府）之间的博弈、承包方内部各政府部门之间的博弈、承包方（移民管理机构）与代理方（乡镇政府、项目申报人）之间的博弈、代理人（项目申报人）与移民（村民）间的博弈导致水库移民后期扶持项目制度设计与制度执行之间存在差距，使得水库移民后期扶持项目资金使用绩效较差。     

基于利他偏好的学习模型及其实验研究

利他行为一直伴随着人类的历史,同时企业的成长过程也是一个不断学习的过程,因此建立基于利他偏好的学习博弈模型更加符合企业的需要,然而目前尚未见此研究.考虑了利他偏好之后,用效用函数取代直接收益,建立了改进的EWA学习模型,确定各参数的取值方法,给出了初始魅力值计算公式.设计了二级供应链情景下的实验,通过实验获得了数据.采用Matlab软件统计分析后发现:与基本EWA模型相比,考虑了利他偏好之后,实验者的策略选择更快地收敛,说明考虑利他偏好后EWA学习模型的学习效果更好.另外,社会距离越小,实验者的策略选择也越快地收敛,说明社会距离对策略的选择有显著影响,企业应该注重培养战略伙伴关系,降低社会距离,形成长期的合作关系.     

考虑消费者预期的电动汽车分时租赁市场价格竞争模型

分时租赁平台作为电动汽车推广的主要方式，其特征与打车软件类似，在风险资本的推动下极易引发价格战。各租车公司的市场需求量不仅与自己的定价有关，也与竞争对手的定价策略相关，目标都是各自利润的最大化。本文在考虑消费者预期的基础上，研究了需求函数为线性情形下的多人博弈，证明了此博弈是超模博弈以及Nash均衡的存在性和唯一性。并进一步揭示了降价幅度、交叉价格和价格敏感消费群体占比对均衡价格、均衡需求量和利润的影响关系，讨论了价格竞争过程中各租车公司的决策过程与利弊关系。结果表明：任意租车公司的降价行为都会引发整个市场的降价反应，且降价幅度随着博弈阶段的推进逐渐减小，最终收敛于均衡价格；动态定价博弈存在最优组合策略，市场竞争时应当把握好降价幅度，避免过度的价格竞争；均衡价格是关于消费者预期的单调减函数，价格敏感的消费群体占比越大，租车公司间价格竞争越激烈，降价幅度会越大，均衡价格越低；对于市场份额大的租车公司利润是关于价格敏感型消费者占比的单调增函数，但对中小租车公司而言则是单调减函数，价格敏感的消费者越多，对大公司有利，对中小公司不利。